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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I take it that my principal qualification for being asked to participate 
in the workshop that gave rise to this paper is that I published an article, 
Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences (JQP) in 1983, in which I 
discussed an issue that had not received sufficient attention.1  Arguments 
for affirmative action frequently appealed to the social and psychological 
advantages that would accrue from greater racial and sexual diversity, 
with the “role modeling” effect being top on the list.  These were not 
arguments for preferential treatment, properly understood, but were 
instead arguments for broadening our conception of the job itself and, 
 *  Visiting Scholar, Department of Clinical Bioethics, National Institutes of 
Health.  Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Vermont. 
 1. Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99 (1983). 




therefore, what counts as a qualification for a job.  On this view, a 
woman mathematics professor who could serve as a role model for 
female students might actually be more qualified than an otherwise 
better qualified male, if encouraging female students to pursue math 
were regarded as one of the qualifications for the job.  It did not take a 
genius to see that this line of argument had potentially disturbing 
implications.  For if being a member of a historically oppressed or 
disadvantaged group could be an asset in certain jobs, it could also be a 
liability. 
For example, and as an empirical matter, it is possible that students 
will learn less from an otherwise better qualified female mathematics 
professor than a lesser qualified male because they do not take a female 
mathematics professor seriously.  Moreover, this was not a small 
problem.  For as soon as one begins to think about the characteristics of 
jobs, it becomes quite apparent that success in many jobs turns on the 
reactions of customers (clients, students, targets) or coworkers to the 
behavior and characteristics of an employee, and so we need to determine 
when such reactions count as bona fide occupational qualifications and 
when they do not. 
Intuitively, it seems that it is sometimes legitimate to count what I 
called “reaction qualifications” (to use an unattractive expression) and 
sometimes not.  In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.2 the Fifth 
Circuit considered whether Pan American’s policy of hiring only 
females as flight attendants was a form of illegal discrimination, even if 
it were a wise business decision given the preferences of its customers, 
most of whom were male.3  The court said “it would be totally 
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the 
customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid.  
Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices that [Title VII of 
the 1965 Civil Rights Act] was meant to overcome.”4  Although the 
Fifth Circuit seemed to think it is easy to determine what counts as the 
sort of prejudice the Act was meant to overcome and those reactions 
which can legitimately be counted, I thought then and continue to think 
that this is much more difficult than is often supposed.  Although I made 
some suggestions as to how we might distinguish between those cases, 
my answers were messy and unsatisfactory.  Moreover, I now think that 
the case for counting arguably illegitimate reactions is somewhat stronger 
than I once thought. 
 2. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 3. Id. at 387. 
 4. Id. at 389. 
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Although my desire to participate in Professor Alexander’s workshop 
was sufficient to motivate my acceptance of his invitation, the fact is that 
I have not written a word about these issues since the early 1980s.  And 
while I did take this occasion to read some of the legal scholarship on 
the issue, particularly the scholarship produced by some of those in 
attendance at this workshop, I have not kept up with what is now an 
enormous body of literature.  With these preemptive strikes being launched, 
my plan is to offer some reflections—not a sustained and well-integrated 
argument—on the themes of the conference and on some arguments 
advanced by Professors Kelman and Yuracko, who have produced some 
of the most important scholarship on the topic.5  I will also offer some 
updated reflections on reaction qualifications and the arguments for 
“laundering preferences” in formulating social policy. 
In the background are two claims that I want to put on the table.  First, 
although it may be wrong for people to engage in a particular form of 
discrimination, it does not follow that the government should seek to 
prevent that discrimination.  Second, although it may not be wrong for 
people to engage in a particular form of discrimination, it does not 
follow that it would be wrong for the government to seek to prevent that 
discrimination or to mitigate its effects.  The wrongness of individual 
behavior is obviously related to the justifiability of state action, but the 
correlation is by no means perfect. 
II.  DISCRIMINATION 
A.  The Rhetoric of Discrimination 
The rhetoric of discrimination is still powerful.  Although scholars 
understand the distinction between the descriptive and neutral sense of 
discrimination, under which to discriminate is simply to make distinctions, 
and the morally loaded sense of discrimination, the word continues to be 
a conversation stopper.  To label a form of distinction-making as 
discrimination is to say that it is wrong and seems to require the 
distinction-maker to defend his practice.  If we think it is seriously 
wrong not to build ramps for the disabled, we refer to it as 
discrimination.  If we are less adamant, we may ask whether we should 
 5. See Mark Kelman, Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2006); Kim Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism, 
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2006). 




provide accommodations to the handicapped.  In my view, nothing turns 
on the label.  The question is whether we should build ramps, not 
whether not doing so is discrimination or nonaccommodation.  If we 
think that affirmative action or preferential treatment is wrong, we refer 
to it as reverse discrimination.  If we think that the use of proxies is 
wrong, we refer to it as stereotyping or profiling or discrimination.  No 
one ever claims that law schools discriminate when they use college 
grades in deciding whom to admit (although such claims are sometimes 
made with respect to LSATs).  If one wants to oppose the use of genetic 
markers in setting insurance premiums, one refers to it as “genetic 
discrimination.”  We rarely say that it is permissible to “discriminate” on 
the basis of race in choosing one’s friends or mates.  We do not use the 
word.  And (virtually) no one says that heterosexuals and homosexuals 
“discriminate” in their choice of sexual partners. 
The invocation of the word discrimination seems to presuppose that 
some decisionmaker is responsible for the resulting inequality of results.  
No one says that we discriminate when we choose to watch male 
basketball players or female ice skaters even if it turns out that the 
aggregation of such preferences yield a pay structure in which male 
basketball players earn more than female basketball players and female 
professional ice skaters earn more than male professional ice skaters.  By 
contrast, it has been argued that Wimbledon discriminates against 
women because the prize for winning the women’s championship is less 
than the prize for the men.6  We do not regard it as wrong when market 
forces produce higher income for some jobs than others or when market 
forces add jobs in one sector and reduce jobs in another.  Moreover, 
whereas we worry about discrimination in hiring for jobs, we do not 
worry as much if a job is not created, if there are few jobs for French 
horn players but many more for violinists.  Moreover, whereas we may 
think it important not to discriminate when hiring for a job, we do not 
view the practice of not firing as wrongful discrimination against the 
more qualified unemployed, a phenomenon for which many college 
professors are no doubt thankful. 
B.  What Makes Discrimination Wrong? 
I believe that Larry Alexander’s article, What Makes Wrongful 
Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 
 6. Associated Press, Men’s Winner Will Still Earn More Than Women’s (April 
26, 2006), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2420833&type=story.  
The French and U.S. Open offer equal prizes to both men and women singles champions.  
See Mark Rice-Oxley, Venus Williams at Wimbledon: Show Women the Money, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), June 29, 2006, at 1. 
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was the first systematic attempt to grapple with the question it poses.7  
Although we will return to his answer below, here I want to pursue his 
question.  When confronted with the question, “Why is it wrong to 
discriminate on the basis of race or sex?,” many will respond that it is 
wrong because a person has no control over those characteristics.  It 
does not take much to show that this cannot be the right answer.  If 
individual acts of discrimination are intrinsically wrong, it must be for 
one of several reasons: (1) they fail to give people what they deserve; 
(2) they violate the target’s rights; (3) they demean, stigmatize, or express 
wrongful values towards the target; or (4) they fail to treat people on the 
basis of the relevant criteria.  If the wrongness of discrimination is not, 
fundamentally, an intrinsic feature of each isolated act of discrimination, 
then it must be a function of its consequences—either the consequences 
of individual acts or the aggregate consequences of similar acts. 
Let us consider these arguments in a bit more detail.  Although it is 
not incoherent to argue that a job should be awarded on the basis of 
desert, and that we wrongfully discriminate when we do not do so, that 
principle cannot be right unless we fudge the notion of desert.  David 
Miller says that a person “deserves a particular job when, as far as we 
can determine, his or her performance in that job will be superior to that 
of all the other applicants by virtue of his or her own personal qualities 
and the legitimate reactions of others.”8  Thus, Miller would argue that if 
a prospective black employee would perform less well than a white 
person because of obstructive behavior by a supervisor or fellow 
employees, it does not follow that he is less deserving—“the predictable 
performance is not connected in the right kind of way to present facts 
about the applicant.”9  Fair enough.  But suppose that a law firm is 
considering candidates, one of whom is a former high-ranking official in 
the Department of Justice.  He may be less talented than other applicants, 
but the firm has reason to believe that his high profile will bring more 
business.  If the law firm can reasonably aim to maximize its profits 
(rather than its legal talent), the former official may be the most 
qualified person for the job, but it would be odd to say that he is most 
deserving.  We might wrongfully discriminate when we fail to award a 
 7. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
 8. David Miller, Deserving Jobs, 42 PHIL. Q. 161, 175-76 (1992). 
 9. Id. at 175. 




job to the best qualified, but not because we fail to award a job to the 
most “deserving.” 
A rights based approach is not likely to prove more promising.  If we 
take a deontic approach to rights, then we need to determine just who 
has what rights.  A deontic right not to be discriminated against is 
unlikely to be helpful because it requires us to determine what sorts of 
discrimination constitute violations of rights and why they do so.  If we 
start with a deontic right of property and association such that an 
employer has a fundamental right to do with his property what he 
wishes, then an antidiscrimination argument cannot even get going.  On 
this view, when A chooses to hire B over C, that decision does not 
violate any rights of C, for, as Koppelman puts (but does not endorse) 
the argument, “[n]o one has a right to compel others to associate with 
her.”10  Koppelman wrongly claims that this argument rests on a 
“dubiously atomistic conception of human life.”11  After all, the point of 
such a right is not to remain isolated, but to frame the way in which 
people should be able to associate with each other.  Neither Koppelman 
nor I may like A’s reasons for associating with B rather than C, but it has 
nothing to do with an atomistic conception of human life.  Koppelman 
may, however, be correct to argue that this approach wrongly assumes 
that people have deontic property rights independent of the consequences of 
their acknowledgement.  He may be right to maintain that we need not 
accept a regime of property rights that leaves the state powerless to assist 
“a permanent outcast population in a state of chronic economic 
misery. . . .”12  But that is just to adopt a consequentialist account of 
rights, in which case we need to determine what regime of rights would 
produce what sorts of consequences.  From that perspective, it is an open 
question as to what such a consequentialist account will yield with 
respect to the right to hire and fire. 
Some argue that the wrongfulness of discrimination is expressive, that 
it is a way of demeaning, stigmatizing, or subordinating the target.  On 
this view, which is similar to the “speech act” view that Rae Langton has 
taken with pornography, the wrongness of discrimination is not to be 
found in the locutionary force of such acts or in its perlocutionary effects 
on the target.13  Rather, it is to be found in its illocutionary force—what 
it does.  Now, I think there is a question as to just what the wrong of 
 10. Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute 
Right to Discriminate?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 33 (2004). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
293, 293, 305-08 (1993); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal 
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). 
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“demeaning” is.  There is clearly a distinction between being demeaned 
and feeling demeaned, where the former is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the latter.  Suppose A spits on B, who appears to be a 
homeless man but who is actually an undercover police officer.  B may 
regard A as a jerk or may even have sympathy with A’s action (had A 
been correct about his target).  Has A demeaned B?  Has A unsuccessfully 
attempted to demean B?  More importantly, it seems that there are many 
cases of alleged wrongful discrimination that have absolutely nothing to 
do with demeaning or stigmatizing—at least as those terms are normally 
understood.  Many cases of alleged sexual discrimination are rooted in 
positive preferences for interacting with, say, males or females and are 
not based on animus or aversion at all.  Consider discrimination in 
insurance: if insurers are wrong to charge higher premiums to those who 
are genetically disposed to be at high risk for a disease, it would be silly 
to say that they are demeaning them or attempting to do so. 
So we might say that the wrong of discrimination consists in not 
treating people on the basis of the criteria on which we ought to treat 
them.  This account may point us in a certain direction, but, of course, 
tells us virtually nothing as to what criteria are morally relevant or 
permissible.  Moreover, and perhaps more important, if this is the wrong 
of discrimination, it is not clear just how wrong discrimination is.  As 
Richard Arneson suggests, we are unlikely to regard “whimsical” or 
“idiosyncratic” hiring practices as seriously wrong because they are 
unlikely to inflict a “significant psychic wound over and above the loss 
of the job.”14  This suggests that much of the wrongness of 
discrimination is likely to be found in the consequences of patterns of 
discrimination and not, at least not principally, in a feature of an isolated 
act. 
C.  How Wrong Is Discrimination? 
In Exploitation, I argued that exploitation, as such, may be less wrong 
than it is commonly thought to be.  Because exploitation is often 
harmful, we may incorrectly assume that exploitation is seriously wrong 
when the exploitee is not harmed.15  Much the same may be true of 
discrimination.  In What Makes Discrimination Wrong?, Larry Alexander 
 14. Richard Arneson, Equality of Opportunity, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(2006), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/achives/win2002/entries/equal-opportunity/. 
 15. ALAN WERTHMEIMER, EXPLOITATION, at ix (1996). 




asks us to assume that acts of discrimination occur within the framework 
of an otherwise just society.16  For the sake of argument, assume something 
like a Rawlsian view of a just basic structure.  Let us assume that 
everyone is granted equal basic liberties, that there is roughly fair 
equality of opportunity, and that social and economic inequalities are in 
accord with the difference principle or that society guaranteed an 
adequate level of economic resources to all those who are able to work.  
While people may be denied particular jobs or positions (say that men 
are never or rarely hired as gynecologists), there are ample opportunities 
for men and women, whites and persons of color, and so forth.  Perhaps 
Jews cannot join a particular golf club, but they are not denied the 
opportunity to golf or practice their Judaism.  Perhaps gay men will not 
be chosen as Boy Scout leaders, but there are numerous positions open 
to them.  Some fraternities do not accept nerds or jocks or whites or 
blacks, but there are ample options available to all.  Would these forms 
of discrimination be seriously wrong?  I honestly do not know.  I am 
reasonably confident that our present intuitions about discrimination are 
of little help, because those intuitions may well be closely tied to the 
actual social consequences of discrimination, or to the history of those 
consequences.  If whites and blacks had relatively equal wealth, income, 
longevity, education, and so forth, it is entirely possible that we would 
not in fact regard isolated acts of racial discrimination as seriously 
wrong.  It is possible, of course, that we would be wrong not to regard 
such acts as seriously wrong, but then we need an argument that does not 
appeal to intuitions.  My general point remains that it is extremely difficult 
to know what is driving our intuitions about acts of discrimination when 
such discrimination has been part of a pattern that has generated massive 
social and economic inequalities. 
I accept what I take to be the dominant line of argument in the legal 
literature on discrimination, namely, that discrimination is wrong not 
primarily because it involves individual animus or aversion, but because 
it contributes to a pattern of social and economic subordination.17  
Interestingly, from that perspective, I believe that both racial and sexual 
discrimination may be less important than they are commonly thought to 
be.  I believe that there is a pattern of racial inequality and subordination, 
but there is reason to think that racial discrimination, as such, is no 
longer a primary cause of that pattern.  By contrast, there may be cases 
of sexual discrimination, but I do not believe that there is now a pattern 
of social and economic subordination. 
 16. Alexander, supra note 7, at 151. 
 17. Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 837-39 (2003). 
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Let me begin with sexual inequality.  I do not doubt that there are 
numerous and important ways in which sexual inequality and injustice 
persist.  Still, I think that there are numerous reasons to suggest that 
sexual inequality is not a pervasive form of social and economic 
inequality and injustice, and that it is on a declining trajectory.  While 
women experienced significant barriers to entry to educational institutions 
and to the professions for many years, it did not take long for women to 
compete successfully with men when those barriers were (substantially) 
removed.  The contrast with racial inequality could not be starker, for 
when barriers to entry for blacks were (largely) eliminated, blacks were 
not in a position to successfully compete with whites—and still are not.  
We know that girls outperform boys in school.  We know that 
approximately 60% of undergraduates are female.18  We know that 
some of the traditional bastions of male dominance, such as medical 
school and law school, now enroll roughly the same number of males 
and females.  We know that women live longer than men.  Although a 
woman is only 14% more likely to die from breast cancer than a man is 
from prostate cancer, funding for breast cancer research is 660% greater 
than funding for prostate cancer research.19  Women do earn less than 
men, but there is good reason to think that the earnings gap is closing 
and that much of the gap is attributable to “life style” choices that, even 
if associated with inequalities within the family, are not attributable to 
injustices by the employers.  To believe in wage discrimination is to 
believe that employers are prepared to pay men more than the market 
requires (they cannot pay women less than the market requires).  
Moreover, an earnings gap is not a spending gap.  Given familial altruism, 
higher earning males will typically share their income with their lower 
earning spouses, whereas no form of altruism shifts disposable income 
from whites to blacks.  There is no reason to think that females receive 
less adequate nutrition or medical care or housing.  Although women are 
more likely to be victimized by sexual offenses, they are less likely to be 
victimized by violent crimes.  Nor should any of this be surprising.  For 
whatever the forms of discrimination that were practiced against women 
 18. See CBS, The Gender Gap: Boys Lagging (May 25, 2003), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/31/60minutes/main527678.shtml; IES NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, FAST FACTS (2005), http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display. 
asp?id=72 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
 19. Marty Nemko, Should We Pay More Attention to Men’s Health?, Sept. 17, 
2006, http://www.martynemko.com/pub/articles/mens-health.shtm. 
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in previous generations, girls and boys were raised in the same households.  
They received the same quality medical care and nutrition.  They went to 
the same schools, and so forth.  And so, for the most part, the developed 
capabilities of males and females have always been quite comparable.  
Moreover, despite all the worries about socialization and the need for 
role models, the aspirations of women changed very quickly when 
barriers to entry were eliminated. 
Interestingly, it is quite likely that the decline of sexual discrimination 
has intensified socioeconomic inequalities that we are loath to describe 
as discrimination or regard as morally problematic.  The problem is 
assortative mating or homogamy.  Both men and women are prone to 
choose mates with similar levels of educational attainment and similar 
earning prospects.  True, some persons, typically male, might prefer to 
mate “down” so that they are the more powerful person in the relationship 
or use their wealth to gain access to “trophy” spouses, whereas others, 
typically female, prefer to mate “up” so that they can garner the economic 
benefits of the higher earning mate.  But, setting aside the mating prospects 
of lower socioeconomic status (SES) attractive women, who are able to 
trade their beauty for income, most persons mate with partners of 
comparable SES.  In some cases, the choices are completely voluntary in 
the sense that high SES persons prefer to mate with high SES persons 
and some lower SES persons would be uncomfortable mating “up.”  But 
even where most people would prefer to mate “up,” they will end up 
with mates at comparable levels because the higher-ranked potential 
mates will already have been taken. 
When one combines assortative mating with the entry of women into 
the paid labor force and the higher paying professions, the consequence 
is likely to be an increase in the inequality of household income, wealth, 
and years of educational attainment.  In the world where women were 
excluded from much of the job force, many desirable positions would go 
to relatively low ability males because they did not have to compete with 
higher ability women, and so lower SES women would be able to garner 
the economic benefits of a higher earning spouse.  In a world where 
women are not excluded from the job force, the lower ability males are 
unable to get these desirable positions.  As a consequence, the high 
ability couple has two desirable positions and the lower ability couple 
has none.  Here we have a situation in which two forms of differential 
treatment combine to generate massive social and economic inequalities 
that are passed down to subsequent generations.  First, we have the 
inequalities of reward for positions that are generated by the market and 
that tend to reward positions that require higher cognitive abilities.  This 
inequality does not result from any direct differentiation by particular 
persons, and so arguably does not qualify as any form of discrimination, 
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even though it is a form of inequality that some have thought to be 
unjust or at least morally questionable because it depends so much on 
the brute luck of the natural lottery.  Second, we have the inequalities 
produced by assortative mating.  These mating choices are the result of 
direct differentiations by particular persons, but they do not seem to 
qualify as wrongful discrimination because they occur in an area of life 
that we believe should be immune from governmental intervention.  I 
am, of course, not claiming that the decline of sexual inequality is bad.  I 
am claiming that the aggregation of non-wrongful choices may have 
justice-related consequences which may demand our attention. 
By contrast with sexual inequality, racial inequality is a massive social 
problem in the United States across the whole spectrum of dimensions of 
well-being: infant mortality, longevity, health, education, income, wealth, 
housing, single-parent families, and so forth.  Yet, even here, it is arguable 
that racial discrimination is not the primary problem.  It is certainly the 
case that decades of racial oppression and discrimination have played the 
dominant causal role in generating contemporary racial inequality, but it 
is much less clear that racial discrimination as such is the primary 
problem today. 
In his important work, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, Glenn Loury 
argued that racial discrimination “should be demoted, dislodged from its 
current prominent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality 
in American life.”20  Loury maintains that while racial discrimination of 
the standard sort has not vanished, it is universally recognized as a moral 
problem, and virtually everyone agrees that it should be proscribed.  
Loury argues that it is of capital importance to distinguish between 
“discrimination in contract” and “discrimination in contact.”21  
Discrimination in contract refers to unequal treatment on the basis of 
race in formal transactions, such as the buying and selling of goods and 
services, whereas discrimination in contact refers to the unequal 
treatment of persons on the basis of race in “the associations and 
relationships that are formed among individuals in social life, including 
the choice of social intimates, neighbors, friends, heroes, and villains.  It 
involves discrimination in the informal, private spheres of life.”22  
Although discrimination in contact may not be as morally objectionable 
as discrimination in contract, indeed, it may not be morally objectionable at 
 20. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 93 (2002). 
 21. Id. at 95. 
 22. Id. at 95-96. 




all, its real-world consequences can be just as debilitating for a racially 
stigmatized group because “the mechanisms of social mobility and 
intergenerational status transmission . . . are crucially sensitive to the 
patterns of contact . . . in that society.”23  Far too many blacks are simply 
unable to gain access to the social resources that are essential to human 
flourishing, but which are acquired through informal but race-influenced 
social intercourse.  Loury argues that the central problem today is racial 
disparity in “developmental opportunities,” and that, as a consequence, 
the developed capabilities of blacks are significantly lower, on average, 
than the developed capabilities of whites.24
On Loury’s view, discrimination in contact gives rise to an intractable 
problem.  Whereas a liberal state could exercise control over discrimination 
in contract, any recognizably liberal state must preserve the freedom of 
individuals to engage in discrimination in contact, and this is so for two 
reasons.  First, “the social exchanges . . . are so profoundly intimate and 
cut so close to the core of our being that all but the most modest 
interventions in this sphere must be avoided if liberty and autonomy are 
to have any real meaning.”25  Second, whereas the ethical case against 
discrimination in contract is relatively easy to make, it is much less 
obvious that there is anything wrong, in principle, with forming or 
avoiding close personal contact on the basis of racial identity.26
The distinction between discrimination in contract and discrimination 
in contact is correlated with the distinction between discrimination, 
which concerns the way in which people are treated, and stigma, which 
concerns the way in which whites understand and perceive their black 
compatriots at the cognitive and emotional level.27  The primary cause of 
discrimination in contact is that white Americans are characterized by 
patterns of thought and biased processes of social cognition that lead 
them to avoid the sorts of contact with black Americans that are crucial 
to acquiring opportunities for social and economic success.  Loury 
argues that this pattern may justify race-conscious policies that show 
promise of mediating the attendant effects.  On his view, the claim that 
race is intrinsically of no moral relevance (which he accepts) does not 
entail the claim that it must be wrong to use race as a basis for public 
policy. 
 23. Id. at 99. 
 24. Id. at 94. 
 25. Id. at 96. 
 26. See id. at 96-97. 
 27. See id. at 167. 
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D.  Mating as Discrimination 
I do not want to pursue those policies here.  However, I want to raise 
the issue of mating once again.  Although we do not regard racial 
preference in mating as a form of discrimination, the fact remains that 
love is not blind when it comes to color and that this has profound social 
consequences.  If blacks and whites married each other without respect 
to race (in which case most whites would marry whites whereas most 
blacks would also marry whites), racial inequality as such would vanish 
within a generation, although class inequality would remain.  I say this 
not only for the tautologous reason that the children of a black mother or 
father would typically have a white parent as well, but because the 
socioeconomic mobility of blacks would increase dramatically.  At 
present, it is difficult for black females to improve their economic 
situation through marriage, in part because black male unemployment is 
very high and so many black males are in prison.  That would change 
with a dramatic increase in intermarriage.  But while racial intermarriage 
has increased from 1% of all married couples in 1970 to 5% in 2000, and 
while hostility towards racial intermarriage has declined (35% favored 
laws against marriages between blacks and whites in the 1970s; 10% 
favored such laws in the 2000s), racial intermarriage between blacks and 
whites is still relatively rare.28
Is this a cause for concern?  Yes, no, and yes.  Larry Alexander writes 
that “discriminatory preferences are intrinsically morally wrong if 
premised on error, moral or factual, about the dispreferred.”29  Now, I do 
not say that racial preferences with respect to potential mates are based 
on either moral or factual error, but it is arguable that it would be 
morally preferable if most of us were less responsive to race, if we 
treated skin color on a par with eye color.  I do not think it an indefensible 
stretch of Alexander’s view to argue that, by this criterion, these kinds of 
discriminatory preferences are morally wrong.  Even if we have a right 
to choose our mates on the basis of any criteria whatsoever (assuming 
that they also choose us), it may be less than morally optimal to choose 
them on the basis of certain criteria.  We may have a right to do wrong. 
So the first answer is yes, racially based mating may be a cause for 
concern.  The second answer may be no.  Alexander says that 
 28. Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. 
Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage, 60 POPULATION BULL., June 2005, at 3, 7. 
 29. Alexander, supra note 7, at 219. 




“[d]iscriminatory preferences are extrinsically morally wrong if their 
social costs are large relative to the costs of eliminating or frustrating 
them.”30  On this two-pronged view, it seems likely that racially biased 
mating preferences are not extrinsically morally wrong.  If I am right, 
racially based mating preferences pass Alexander’s first test: “harmful 
social effects will ensue from bias, given the numbers and group 
characteristics.”31  But they are unlikely to pass the second test.  Given 
the prevalence, strength, and low malleability of these preferences, it 
seems likely that the social costs of using the coercive powers of the 
state to eliminate or frustrate them would be even higher.  Of course, 
even if a liberal state should not exercise its coercive powers in this 
arena, it is an open question as to whether it should use the moral 
educational powers of the state to motivate people not to choose 
potential mates by the color of their skin but by the content of their 
character or whatever other characteristics are morally acceptable for 
such preferences. 
Let us assume that the pattern of racially biased mating choices has 
harmful social effects, but that people have a right to make racially 
biased mating choices and that the legitimate use of the legitimate 
powers of the state is unlikely to significantly alter those preferences.  
That is not the end of the story.  Precisely because society decides to 
allow racially based mating choices, it may also acquire a responsibility 
to remedy or soften the harmful social consequences of such choices.  
We can think of this problem in Rawlsian terms.  Rawls argues that a 
just society will guarantee certain basic liberties to all and that it will 
also seek to promote equality of fair opportunity.32  There are, however, 
limits on society’s ability to realize these ends.  For example, Rawls 
explicitly recognizes that “the principle of fair opportunity can be only 
imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of the family 
exists.”33  Put crudely, some families are better than others.  We could 
seek to eliminate the family so as to guarantee equal opportunity, at least 
in this respect, but that is not only not feasible, it is entirely possible that 
the freedom to form families is one of the basic freedoms which the first 
principle requires and which has priority over the principle of fair 
opportunity.  Much the same is true for the arbitrary effects of the 
natural lottery.  Even if it were feasible to equalize people’s natural 
talents through bio-medical intervention, and Rawls does not consider 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 163. 
 32. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 266 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 33. Id. at 64. 
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that possibility, it is likely that he would reject that policy on moral 
grounds.34
Enter the “difference principle.”  Precisely because there are limits on 
our ability to realize fair equality of opportunity and precisely because 
we cannot or should not seek to eliminate arbitrary effects of the natural 
lottery, Rawls seeks a principle which recognizes these facts and which 
mitigates their effects.  Thus, Rawls advances the “difference principle,” 
which holds that the more favored may benefit from their undeserved 
and arbitrary assets but only on certain terms “that improve the situation 
of those who have lost out.”35
We do not need to endorse the entire structure or content of Rawls’s 
theory.  The general point is that if there are moral reasons to allow 
people to make choices that generate social harm or injustice, we may 
also have moral reason to address their effects, and particularly so when 
the choices themselves result from a morally questionable preference 
structure.  Just as social security taxes are the price we pay for not 
having our parents live with us, a set of social programs or policies that I 
will not seek to specify here may be the price that we have to pay for 
allowing people the freedom to indulge their racially biased mating 
preferences.  We can and sometimes should take collective responsibility 
for harms that we did not cause36 and for harms that we may have a right 
to cause. 
III.  REACTION QUALIFICATION REVISITED 
Give a boy a hammer and everything becomes a nail.  As I 
(re)watched episodes of Seinfeld, I noted at least three episodes in which 
reaction qualifications come to the fore. 
BREASTS.  In one episode, Jerry and Elaine notice that all the waitresses 
in their coffee shop are amply endowed.  Here is the dialogue: 
JERRY: Yeah.  Have you noticed anything else that’s different since the new 
management? 
ELAINE: Mmm.  They’re putting a little lemon in the tuna.  I love that. 
JERRY: Beside that.  Look at the waitresses. 
ELAINE: Yeah?  (we see that all the waitresses have big breasts) 
 34. See id. at 89-92. 
 35. Id. at 87. 
 36. For example, disabilities and genetic susceptibility. 




JERRY: What physical characteristic would you say is common to all of them? 
ELAINE: Ah . . . . 
JERRY: I mean look at this.  Every waitress working here has the same 
proportions.  Wouldn’t you say? 
ELAINE: Yes, I would say. 
JERRY: What’s going on here?  How is that possible? 
ELAINE: Do you think it’s a coincidence? 
JERRY: No.  I haven’t seen four women like this together outside of a Russ 
Meyer film. 
(the waitress finally came with the coffee) 
ELAINE: (to the waitress)  Hi.  Excuse me.  Who does all the hiring waitresses 
here? 
WAITRESS: He does.  (pointing to the manager, Mr. Visaki)  In fact we’re 
looking for another girl if you know anyone.  (she walks away) 
ELAINE: You know what?  That’s discriminatory.  That is unfair.  Why should 
these women have all the advantages?  It’s not enough they get all the attention 
from men, they have to get all the waitress jobs, too?  [It turns out that these 
women had similar figures not because the restaurant owner was catering to the 
preferences of superficial males, but because they were his daughters.]37
THE MASSEUR.  George and Elaine go to get massages and George finds 
that his will be performed by a man.  Here is the dialogue. 
RECEPTIONIST: George and Elaine, right?  Could you fill these out for me 
please?  And Elaine, you’ll be seeing Julianna, and George, you’ll be with 
Raymond. 
GEORGE: Excuse me, did you say ‘Raymond’? 
RECEPTIONIST: Yes. 
GEORGE: But, uh, Raymond is a man. 
RECEPTIONIST: That’s right. 
GEORGE: I can’t get a massage from a man. 
ELAINE: Why not? 
GEORGE: What, are you crazy?  I can’t have a man touching me.  Switch with 
me. 
ELAINE: No, I don’t want the man either. 
GEORGE: What’s the difference, you’re a woman.  They’re supposed to be 
touching you. 
ELAINE: He’d just be touching your back. 
GEORGE: He’d just be touching your back too. 
ELAINE: No, it could get sexual. 
 37.  Seinfeld: The Pilot (NBC television broadcast, Season 4, Episode 1) (transcript 
available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/ThePilot.html).  
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GEORGE: I know.  That’s the point.  If it’s gonna get sexual, it should get 
sexual with you. 
ELAINE: I wouldn’t be comfortable. 
GEORGE: I would?  What if something happens? 
ELAINE: What could happen? 
GEORGE: What if it felt good? 
ELAINE: It’s supposed to feel good. 
GEORGE: I don’t want it to feel good. 
[The experience proved traumatic for George because he thinks that he was 
aroused by Raymond’s massage.]38
THE CHINESE WOMAN.  In this episode, George’s mother, Estelle, has a 
conversation on the phone with a woman named Donna Chang (it has 
been shortened from Changstein).  George’s parents have been 
considering divorce, and Estelle was inclined to take the advice seriously 
until she discovered that Donna Chang was not Asian.  Here is the 
dialogue. 
ESTELLE: You’re not Chinese!?!? 
DONNA: [pause]  No. 
ESTELLE: I thought you were Chinese!! 
DONNA: I’m from Long Island. 
ESTELLE: Long Island?!?!  I thought I was getting advice from a Chinese 
woman!! 
DONNA: I’m sorry . . . ? 
ESTELLE: Well!  Then, that changes everything! 
GEORGE: What?! 
ESTELLE: She’s not Chinese; I was duped!! 
GEORGE: So what?!  She gave you advice; what’s the difference if she’s not 
Chinese?!?! 
ESTELLE: I’m not taking advice from some girl from Long Island!!39
Let us suppose that the restaurateur did hire large breasted women 
because he correctly thought that it was good for business.  Let us 
 38.  Seinfeld: The Note (NBC television broadcast, Season 3, Episode 19) (transcript 
available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheNote.html). 
 39.  Seinfeld: The Chinese Woman (NBC television broadcast, Season 6, Episode 
90) (transcript available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/episodes_overview.html). 




suppose that the majority of people prefer masseuses to masseurs.  Let 
us suppose that people prefer Asian advice givers or Jamaican fortune 
tellers.  Let us suppose, then, that an employer would be making a 
rational market decision to discriminate on the basis of sex and breast 
size, sex, and race.  Or, as in a recent case, let us suppose that Jazzercise, 
a franchise operation, is making a rational market decision when it 
refused to hire a highly fit 5’8” 240-pound woman who sought work as 
an aerobics instructor because she did not possess a “fit appearance.”40  
Would it be wrong for them to do so? 
Most legal scholars41 endorse normatively as well as legally the view 
that employers should be prohibited from hiring on the basis of race or 
sex when those hirings are profit-maximizing, because customers, or 
clients, or “targets,” or other employees are prejudiced.  Consider Mark 
Kelman’s argument.  Kelman defines simple discrimination as “differential 
treatment despite equality along ‘relevant’ dimensions,”42 such as when 
an employer refuses to hire an applicant on the basis of an irrelevant 
characteristic just because he has an aversion to persons with that 
characteristic.43  Laws prohibiting simple discrimination prohibit the 
employer from treating people worse than they treat others who provide 
them equal amounts of money.  So if a black widget maker would make 
just as many widgets as a white widget maker, the employer engages in 
simple discrimination if he refuses to hire the black applicant because of 
the applicant’s race.  Laws prohibiting simple discrimination protect 
applicants from such “market-irrational treatment.”44
By contrast, consider a case in which a retailer prefers to hire a white 
person because he correctly believes that his potential customers will 
buy more from a white salesperson than a black salesperson even if the 
black candidate would perform all the “physical” aspects of the job in 
precisely the same manner as the white applicant.  Or similarly, consider 
a case in which a restaurant owner correctly believes that she will do 
more business if she hires attractive young women as waitresses rather 
than men.  In other words, we will assume that the employer’s decision 
is not rooted “in animus or false stereotypes but in private economic 
rationality.”45  As Kelman notes, the positive law is clear.  Employers 
cannot make market rational decisions that reflect racist or sexist 
 40. Dan Ackman, The Case of the Fat Aerobics Instructor, FORBES, May 9, 2002, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/09/0509portnick.html (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006). 
 41. Richard Epstein is a notable exception. 
 42. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 840 
(2001). 
 43. Id. at 848. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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customer reactions.  Kelman argues that we should regard these sorts of 
reaction qualification cases as a version of “simple discrimination” by 
the employers.  Why?  Because the customers themselves are “duty-bound” 
to treat employees “with whom they deal in an impersonal, capitalist, 
rational fashion,” and so the right of a prospective employee against 
discrimination by the employer forbids the employer from acting as an 
agent for the customer’s illegitimate preferences.46  Similarly, Samuel 
Bagenstos states that most scholars “have had little difficulty attributing 
to employers the animus of their customers or employees,” although 
many cases seem to involve profit-maximizing rather than “animus.”47
Something like this dispute plays itself out in discussions of the 
“essence” of a business.  On one view, many businesses have a particular 
essence.  The essence of an airline is to transport passengers.  The essence 
of a restaurant is to serve food.  From that perspective, flight attendants 
should be chosen on the basis of their ability to assist in transporting 
passengers safely.  On another view, businesses do not have essence.  
They exist to make a profit, and do so by providing their customers with 
whatever it is that the customers desire as realized through the market.  
Kimberly Yuracko argues that the latter view is really an argument “for 
essences of a different sort,” namely, “market responsiveness, with all the 
complexity this may entail.”48  That linguistic move does not collapse the 
distinction at stake here.  For whatever terms we use, there is a crucial 
difference between the constrained account of business essence to which 
the Court appealed in Diaz and the pluralistic openness of a “market 
responsiveness” conception of business essence that views businesses as 
serving the variegated preferences of its customers. 
Setting positive law aside, when is it legitimate for employers to take 
account of the preferences of customers or, more broadly, the reactions 
of the persons whose reactions to the behavior or characteristics of an 
 46. Id. 
 47. Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 849 n.66 (citing, for example, John Donohue, who 
argues that “intrinsic equality measures workers based on the ‘true value of [their] labor’ 
and disregards any preferences customers or coworkers have against associating with 
particular classes of workers,” and Owen M. Fiss who has made a similar argument).  
Bagenstos adds that he sees no need to dispute that view and that he will treat “customer-
or coworker-preference-based discrimination as animus-based discrimination.”  See id. at 
849-51 (acknowledging that many forms of present-day problems of discrimination by 
employers involve maximizing profit and not “animus”). 
 48. A view adopted by Richard A. Epstein.  See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private 
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 147, 166 n.63 (2004). 
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employee are crucial to the position?  I shall refer to such persons as 
reactors.  Although I did not solve this issue in JQP, I may have 
underestimated, if anything, the range of jobs for which reactions are 
crucial to an employee’s effectiveness.  Indeed, as our economy becomes 
increasingly dominated by services as opposed to products and 
manufacturing, the proportion of jobs in which reaction qualifications 
(some scholars use the phrase “soft qualifications”) will figure 
prominently will also increase.  The case of the racially prejudiced retail 
customers or the sexist airline travelers grossly understates the problem.  
Here are some examples: 
(I)  POLICE OFFICERS 
The efficacy of a police officer may depend upon his or her ability to 
make citizens feel safe, to get suspects to cooperate nonviolently, to 
encourage citizens to come forth with information, and the confidence of 
his or her fellow officers, et cetera.  In turn, these responses may be 
influenced by the officer’s race, sex, size, demeanor, and so on. 
(II)  TEACHERS 
The efficacy of a teacher depends upon his or her ability to induce 
learning.  This may depend, among other things, upon the teacher’s 
ability to establish order and discipline in the classroom.  Student 
reactions to a teacher’s sex, size, and race may all affect the teacher’s 
efficacy. 
(III)  TEACHING ASSISTANTS 
A teacher’s ability also depends upon the capacity of students to 
understand the teacher’s speech.  American college students often find it 
hard to understand foreign-born teaching assistants.  This may be 
partially due to preferences, but is most likely a simple function of one’s 
unconscious ability to decipher speech. 
(IV)  LAWYERS 
The efficacy of a lawyer turns, in part, on the way in which other 
attorneys, witnesses, judges, jurors, and clients respond to him or her.  
This may not only involve reactions to the lawyer’s physical acts, 
including oral statements and written documents, but to his or her 
personality, demeanor, aggressiveness, et cetera.  Moreover, the success 
of a lawyer as a source of income to his or her firm depends, in part, 
upon the preferences of clients.  If clients prefer to be represented by 
aggressive males rather than 5’0” females, then aggressive males will 
generate more income for the firm and, in that sense, are more qualified, 
other things being equal. 
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(V)  ADVERTISING MODELS 
Obviously, the efficacy of a model is a function of his or her ability to 
induce customers to purchase the product.  Customers may respond to 
sex, beauty, bodily shape, height, race, ethnicity, et cetera. 
(VI)  ROLE MODELS 
It is sometimes argued that other things (roughly) equal, we should 
hire persons of a particular sex or race because they can serve as a role 
model for people who identify with that characteristic and where those 
reactions may be independent of any action by the employee. 
(VII)  GYNECOLOGIST 
The efficacy of a physician is a function of his or her diagnostic and 
therapeutic abilities, but is also a function of the physician’s capacity to 
induce trust, openness, and compliance in the patient.  If females 
respond more favorably and are more likely to seek out care from a 
female gynecologist than a male gynecologist, then, ceteris paribus, a 
female will be more effective. 
(VIII)  PITCHERS 
The efficacy of a baseball pitcher is a function of his ability to prevent 
the opponents from scoring runs.  Period.  If batters of a particular team 
find it difficult to hit a left-handed pitcher, then a left hander is better 
qualified to pitch against this team even if, on other criteria, he is less 
able than a right handed pitcher. 
(IX)  RESTAURANTS 
The market value of a chef is not defined by his or her ability to 
produce the highest quality food as evaluated by the gourmet, but by his 
or her ability to attract customers.  And the same is true for servers, be it 
Hooters, Joe’s Stone Crab, or Jerry Seinfeld’s coffee shop.  It is worth 
noting that Zagat’s guides specifically evaluate restaurants on ambience, 
and there is no reason to doubt that the sex or race or attractiveness or 
personality of the servers contributes to that ambience.49  Consider this 
excerpt from a New York Times restaurant review on the day after this 
paragraph was originally written: 
 49. For example, Durgin Park in Boston may require that its servers are rude. 




Table XII is defiantly retro and proudly old-fashioned, in terms of both its food 
and its setting.  The long path from the entrance to the dining room is covered in 
leopard print carpeting.  That dining room has white walls with gleaming gold 
trim and an air of unabashed Old World opulence. . . . The servers wear crisply 
pressed suits with tightly buttoned jackets, and everything about the way they move 
and gesture has a somewhat antiquated, but endearing, formality.  What they strive 
to project is not so much affability as respect.  Remember those days?50
(X)  PRIVATE NURSES 
As Kim Yuracko points out, female patients may have a distinct 
preference to be cared for by female nurses.51
(XI)  SALESPEOPLE 
The job of a salesperson is to sell.  Customers may respond (consciously 
or unconsciously) to the race, sex, personality, height, and beauty of the 
salesperson. 
(XII)  AIRPORT SCREENERS 
When body searches are to be performed, female travelers have a 
strong preference to be searched by female screeners rather than male 
screeners (I do not know whether men have any strong preference here).  
If minimizing passenger discomfort is part of the job’s qualifications (it 
may not be), then women are more qualified to do body searches of 
female passengers. 
(XIII)  INTERIOR DECORATORS 
If we evaluate interior decorators by their business success rather than 
aesthetically, customers may prefer effeminate males to more masculine 
males or females because customers believe that gay men have superior 
aesthetic taste.  A similar phenomenon may hold with respect to hair 
stylists. 
It is clear, then, that the preferences and reactions of persons 
dramatically affect or even define an employee’s job effectiveness and 
that these reactions can be (consciously or unconsciously) responsive to 
an employee’s race, sex, ethnicity, personality, speech patterns, bodily 
shape, and so forth.  The question is this: When is it morally legitimate 
for employers to consider the relevant reactions as a dimension of a 
prospective employee’s efficacy in deciding whom to hire?  There are 
only two plausible positions.52  First, it could be argued that it is always 
 50. Frank Bruni, Diner’s Journal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at E41. 
 51. Yuracko, supra note 48, at 170. 
 52. It would be preposterous to adopt a third view, under which it is always 
illegitimate for employers to take account of reactions. 
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legitimate for a business to make reaction-based market rational decisions,53 
even when those reactions reflect preferences of dubious moral legitimacy.  
Second, it could be argued that it is sometimes legitimate for businesses 
to make reaction-based market rational decisions and sometimes not.  Let 
us assume that some version of the second view is correct.  What 
version?  It is clear that our intuitions vary from case to case.  I suspect 
that some cases will produce high consensus, whereas others will not.  
We are inclined to think that a retailer should not cater to the racial 
prejudices of his customers, but that it is perfectly reasonable for a 
university to cater to the sexual preference of its female students in 
hiring a gynecologist, and that a nursing home could legitimately hire 
female nurses for its female patients.  Can we find a plausible principle 
by which to make these distinctions? 
I think this is very difficult indeed.  It is clearly not enough to say that 
employers should not take account of responder’s reactions when they 
result from prejudice.  That begs the question as to what counts as a 
“prejudice.”  Was George “prejudiced” against masseurs?  Was Estelle 
“prejudiced” against non-Asian advisors?  Are reactions based on non-
spurious proxies a case of prejudice?  And should we treat all “prejudices” 
equally?  In JQP, I argued that given the social context and given the 
nation’s history, it was more legitimate to hire a black police officer for 
a black community, if the black officer was more qualified than the 
white because of reaction qualifications, than to hire a white police 
officer for a white community for similar reasons.54  Of course, even if 
this were so as a matter of morality, it might still make sense for the law 
to adopt a race neutral approach under which these two hirings stand or 
fall together. 
Interestingly, even when it is otherwise illegitimate to count reactions 
to race, there may be overriding moral reason to do so.  Suppose that 
white citizens in a predominantly white community are less likely to 
cooperate with black police officers than with white police officers and 
that, as a result, more innocent people are victimized if blacks are hired.  
It is arguable that the interests of prospective victims outweigh the 
interests of job candidates.55
 53. Indeed, it could be argued that they should be permitted to make market 
irrational decisions; however, this Article does not address that argument. 
 54. Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 107. 
 55. This Article will ignore consequentialist arguments that maintain that, in the 
long run, it will prove better to “sacrifice” some victims of crime in order to reduce 




Whereas some racist and sexist preferences seem to involve aversions, 
others appear to be “pro” preferences.  Whatever else we might want to 
say, it is obvious that Hooters, Playboy Bunnies, and Southwest Airlines 
(in its previous incarnation as a “love” airline rather than a low cost 
airline), do or did not involve sexual distinctions rooted in aversion.  Or 
is it so obvious?  Andrew Koppelman seems to want to turn this 
preference lemonade into a preference lemon: 
The idea that women are particularly well suited for the task of flight attendant, 
for example, is closely associated with the idea of separate, ascriptive spheres 
for men and women, and that idea, we have seen, is closely associated with the 
devaluation of women.  The customers’ preferences thus have a component that 
is malign, that denies respect for persons.  If we respect preferences only 
because we respect persons, then we must withhold our respect from these 
preferences.56
This moves much too quickly.  First, unless we tautologically define a 
male’s desire to be served by flight attendants as equivalent to believing 
that they are “particularly well suited” for the task, I see no reason to 
think that the male customers of Southwest Airlines believed that 
women “are particularly well suited for the task of flight attendant.”  
Second, it is not clear what it is for that preference to be “closely 
associated” with another.  Third, absent the relevant psychological 
evidence, I simply see no reason to think that this preference is rooted in 
a commitment to separate spheres.  If Marx’s vision of communist 
society was one in which people can “hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner . . . without 
ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic,”57 cannot men be 
attentive fathers to their daughters in the morning, work with female 
colleagues in the afternoon, and enjoy going to Hooters after work 
before returning home to their professional wives?  Fourth, I simply do 
not see why this is a malign preference that implies the “devaluation of 
women” or denies respect for persons.  This may be so, but it seems to 
load much too much psychological weight onto something that may be 
much simpler and much less malignant.  Even in sex, sometimes a cigar 
is just a cigar. 
racial prejudice and inequality.  The principle may be valid and the prediction is 
plausible; however, it is simply too difficult to assess. 
 56. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 140 
(1996) (emphasis in original). 
 57. Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 160 
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1932). 
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A.  Laundering Preferences 
Let us assume what I doubt is the case, namely, that Koppelman’s 
description of these preferences is correct.  Does it follow that we should 
not count such preferences or that we should prohibit others from 
counting them?  Napoleon once said, “[e]ven if I had done wrong you 
should not have accused me publicly.  People wash their dirty linen at 
home.”58  If we have dirty preferences in our minds, should we move 
them to the public realm, where, as a matter of public policy, employers 
are required to launder or discount or ignore those preferences?  
Koppelman thinks so, as does David Strauss: 
The judgment that taste-based discrimination is wrong rests primarily on the 
view that the taste for racial discrimination is illegitimate.  That is, no one 
should be made worse off simply to satisfy someone else’s racial animus.  The 
satisfaction of the desire not to associate with members of another racial group, 
at least in the employment context, should not count in the social welfare 
function.59
There are two strategies for the principle that we should not allow 
employers to count the illegitimate preferences of responders.  The first 
strategy adopts a general consequentialist framework and maintains that 
the long-term consequences of adopting a decision rule of allowing 
employers to count such preferences has suboptimal consequences if we 
give equal consideration to the interests of all, but that decision is 
reached after giving full weight to such preferences in assessing the 
range of decision rules.  All preferences are counted as inputs in the 
calculation of the best social policy, but the output of the process yields 
a decision rule that some inputs should be ignored.  The second strategy, 
which is adopted by Koppelman and Will Kymlicka, among others, 
maintains that a consequentialist argument for counting certain sorts of 
illegitimate preferences as inputs is inconsistent with the underlying 
moral motivation for respecting preferences in the first place.  As 
Koppelman puts it, “If we respect preferences only because we respect 
persons, then we must withhold our respect from these preferences.”60  
 58. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150-
51 (1989). 
 59. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1618, 1625 (1991) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 60. KOPPELMAN, supra note 56, at 140. 




Will Kymlicka argues that if the “deepest principle” for utilitarianism is 
egalitarian, the notion that “[e]ach person has an equal moral standing,” 
then it seems inconsistent to count preferences which deny that 
principle.61
It is possible that the first argument works to support preference 
laundering, but since that would depend upon complicated calculations, I 
will set that argument aside.  With respect to the second argument, here 
too I am inclined to think that the argument moves much too quickly.  
Even if we accept the view that consequentialism is best justified as a 
way of instantiating a commitment to the equal worth of all persons, it 
simply does not follow that the underlying motivation must be used as a 
screening device for the inputs into that consequentialism.  To exemplify 
this point, note that Rawls does not insist that individuals in a just 
society must be motivated by the principles that define the basic 
structure in which they operate: 
Ideally the rules should be set up so that men are led by their predominant 
interests to act in ways which further socially desirable ends.  The conduct of 
individuals guided by their rational plans should be coordinated as far as 
possible to achieve results which although not intended or perhaps even 
foreseen by them are nevertheless the best ones from the standpoint of social 
justice.62
If a just society can allow individuals to be motivated by self-interest, 
there is no logical inconsistency in claiming that a commitment to the 
equal moral worth of persons or to equal respect is compatible with 
counting preferences that do not reflect that commitment.  Even when 
preferences are immoral, it may not be immoral to count them.  After all, 
we respect people in numerous ways, but one way in which we respect 
people is, within reason, to avoid being too judgmental about their 
preferences.  We generally think it best to grant freedom of speech to 
those who deny that value.  And we might think it best to count the 
preferences of those who do not as committed to equal respect for all 
persons. 
Indeed, one can go farther.  If, as Koppelman suggests, most versions 
of consequentialism are motivated by a commitment to equal respect for 
individuals, it could be argued, although Koppelman does not, that this 
requires everyone to act on that principle.  After all, to act on the basis of 
self-interested desires or to show partiality towards one’s family or 
friends is not to show equal respect; it does not reflect the commitment 
to impartiality that motivates consequentialism.  This is the view 
 61. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 36-37 (1990). 
 62. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 49. 
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famously adopted by Peter Singer.63  Setting aside how individuals should 
act, it could be argued that, for the same reasons, public policy should 
refuse to count preferences that do not reflect such a commitment.  
And that seems to go too far.  Now one might try to drive a wedge 
between the partial preferences that a commitment to impartiality does 
allow and the prejudiced preferences that it does not.  Along with 
Koppelman, one might say, for example, that it is permissible for me to 
prefer my wife’s interests to a stranger’s interests, but not to prefer being 
served by men rather than women, or women rather than men, or whites 
rather than blacks.  But it is by no means clear how such an argument 
would go and whether it would prove successful. 
Another difficulty with the claim that “illegitimate” preferences should 
not be counted is that the notion of an illegitimate preference is decidedly 
ambiguous.  If it refers to preferences that should not be counted, then it is 
simply true by definition, but obviously solves nothing.  If it refers to 
preferences that are bad or less than optimal for people to have, then it 
clearly ranges much too widely.  After all, the market as we know it 
caters to all sorts of arguably illegitimate preferences: cigarettes, 
professional wrestling, reality television, SUVs, breast implants, pornographic 
movies, expensive cappuccino makers, enormous homes, and the like, 
not to mention bad Chinese food and tofu.  We allow people to solicit 
dates on christiansingles.com, jdate.com, and blackpeoplemeet.com.  We 
can argue about which, if any, of these preferences are illegitimate, but it 
would be crazy to think that, as a general principle, we could or should 
try to prevent the market from accommodating illegitimate preferences. 
I have not attempted to nor have I produced a knock-down argument 
against laundering preferences or for the view that all preferences should 
be counted.  If we adopt a general consequentialist strategy, it is an open 
question as to whether the best regime will allow employers to respond 
to whatever reactions the responders bring to the table or will instead 
require employers not to take account of certain reactions and, if so, 
which ones.  On the one hand, there might be utilitarian reasons to adopt 
a regime in which we accepted people’s preferences as we find them, 
including biased or prejudiced preferences that are demonstrably malign, 
just as there might be utilitarian reasons to adopt a regime in which 
people are permitted to act on partiality.  At the same time, it is also 
 63. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 230-
32 (1972). 




possible that from an impartial consequentialist perspective in which we 
counted all preferences as inputs, we might decide on a regime that 
discounted such preferences nonetheless because discounting them 
promoted more utility in the long run, including the utility that would be 
derived from changes in people’s preferences.  Consider this analogy: 
Fred Schauer has argued that while there is nothing wrong, in principle, 
with using proxies or profiling when they are non-spurious, there might 
be good reason to prohibit the use of proxies or profiling based on race 
or sex even when it would otherwise be desirable to do so.  For if there 
is a tendency to overuse certain sorts of proxies and we cannot reliably 
determine when the use of a proxy is reasonable, the best strategy might 
be to ban an entire category of proxies.64  Similarly, here, perhaps it is 
reasonable for Joe’s Stone Crab or Table XII to hire only males in order 
to create a particular ambiance, but if we cannot reliably distinguish the 
occupations in which such distinctions make sense from those where 
they do not, it is possible that it is better to prohibit all such distinction-
making. 
B.  Public and Private 
I say it is possible.  As Richard Arneson has argued, the ideal of 
equality of opportunity applies to public life but not to private life.65  In 
effect, the argument for laundering preferences in order to combat 
wrongful discrimination seeks to convert what are arguably private 
preferences into a target for public policy.  Unfortunately, and as Arneson is 
well aware, it is not as if we begin with a well-established distinction 
between the public and the private spheres, such that President Clinton’s 
sexual behavior was located in the private realm (or was it the public?).  
As Fred Schauer puts it, “private” is typically the label we attach to 
those activities and domains in which, for already decided normative 
reasons, there is a justified interest in excluding someone else.66  And so 
the left is now inclined to argue that sexuality and abortion are matters 
of the private realm whereas discriminatory preferences are matters for 
the public realm, while the right is apt to argue that sexuality and 
abortion are matters of the public realm and discriminatory preferences 
are matters of the private realm. 
It is unlikely to prove correct that all hiring decisions are legitimate 
targets of public policy.  Arneson suggests, for example, that whom a 
small business hires may be a private matter (it is fine if a restaurateur 
 64. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES & STEREOTYPES (2003). 
 65. Arneson, supra note 14. 
 66. Frederick Schauer, Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, 17 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 293, 293 (2000). 
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wants to hire his family or friends) but whom it serves is a public matter 
(it is not fine if he excludes blacks).67  That is simply a way of saying 
that the state does not have a sufficient interest in his hiring to justify 
interference where it may have a sufficient interest in whom he serves.  
And I take it that virtually no one would deny a family’s right to choose 
a babysitter or nanny on the basis of whatever criteria it prefers, be it 
race, sexual orientation, or religion, even if we think that some of those 
preferences do not pass moral muster. 
In the previous section I argued that there may be good reasons for the 
state to adopt a general policy that would require firms to ignore certain 
preferences even if it were economically rational for them to be 
counted.68  And it is possible that this argument will prove decisive.  At 
the same time, it is also arguable that we should be strongly disposed 
against placing a person’s beliefs and attitudes in the public realm, that 
is, to make them a basis for public policy.  At this juncture, I want to 
bring Thomas Nagel’s reflections on moral psychology to bear on our 
topic.  In Concealment and Exposure, Nagel maintains that “[t]he grasp 
of the public sphere and public norms has come to include too much.”69  
He argues that many of the conventions of daily life are meant to keep a 
“great range of potentially disruptive [psychic] material unacknowledged 
and therefore out of play.”70  This material includes “feelings of hostility, 
contempt, derision, envy, vanity, boredom, fear, sexual desire or aversion, 
plus a great deal of simple self-absorption.”71
It is not just a matter of adopting social conventions that allow us to 
conceal our innermost thoughts.  It is also a matter of putting restraints 
on the force of morality and conscience: “Everyone is entitled to commit 
murder in the imagination once in a while, not to mention lesser 
infractions.”72  As a general principle, “the idea that socialization should 
penetrate to the innermost reaches of the soul, so that one should feel 
guilty or ashamed of any thoughts or feelings that one would be unwilling 
to express publicly” is downright pernicious.73  So, not unexpectedly for 
a man of the left who continues to use “he” as a generic pronoun, Nagel 
argues that “[t]he demand for public lip-service to certain pieties and 
 67. Arneson, supra note 14. 
 68. See generally supra Part III.A. 
 69. Thomas Nagel, Concealment & Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1998). 
 70. Id. at 6. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 7. 
 73. Id. at 9. 




vigilance against tell-tale signs in speech of unacceptable attitudes or 
beliefs is due to an insistence that deep cultural conflicts should not 
simply be tolerated, but must be turned into battles for control of the 
common space.”74  And this we should resist. 
Nagel is eminently aware that his argument can be understood as 
being “too protective of the status quo” and that it will not satisfy those 
who “think it necessary to overthrow pernicious conventions like the 
double standard of sexual conduct . . . .”75  Yet he argues that “to the 
extent . . . compatible with the protection of private rights, it would be 
better if these battles for the soul of the culture were avoided . . . .”76 and 
that: 
No one should be in control of the culture, and the persistence of private racism, 
sexism, homophobia, religious and ethnic bigotry, sexual puritanism, and other 
such private pleasures should not provoke liberals to demand constant public 
affirmation of the opposite values.  The important battles are about how people 
are required to treat each other, how social and economic institutions are to be 
arranged, and how public resources are to be used.77
Even if Nagel’s argument is sound with respect to its principal target, 
it may be thought that it is not entirely on point.  For Nagel is primarily 
concerned with our thoughts and not with our actions, not with how we 
“treat each other.”  It is possible that employer decisions responding to 
racial prejudices and sexual feelings are of a different order, that this 
concerns how people are treated and not with what is in someone’s mind.  
But I think Nagel’s argument still has traction.  If firms are required to 
ignore the preferences or reactions of their customers or clients because 
we have made a judgment that those preferences are illegitimate, then it 
is as if the preferences themselves are treated as a form of action.  As 
Kelman puts it, “[c]ustomers are duty-bound under antidiscrimination 
law to treat salespeople with whom they deal in an impersonal, 
capitalist, rational fashion . . . .”78  But it is one thing for one to treat 
those with whom one interacts in a rational fashion and another to have 
preferences about the sorts of persons with whom one interacts.  I can 
imagine people who will treat those with whom they do interact in an 
impersonal rational fashion, but who would prefer not to interact with 
them for reasons that are not impersonal and rational.  And it is by no 
means clear that the world will be a better place when all those 
preferences are put to the test of hyperrationality. 
 74. Id. at 23. 
 75. Id. at 28. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 30. 
 78. Kelman, supra note 42, at 848. 
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Consider the preference for the beautiful.  It is no doubt just as well 
that antidiscrimination law has not yet treated the non-beautiful as a 
suspect classification or as a disability that must be accommodated under 
the A.D.A., although it has been argued that the A.D.A. should be 
extended in precisely that way.79  Part of the story here is that the 
inequalities attached to attractiveness are not as systemic or entrenched 
as the inequalities of race.  Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how we 
might instantiate a nondiscriminatory principle without doing more harm 
to those whose interests we were attempting to protect.  Still, the 
literature is replete with disparaging remarks about the preference for 
“gaze objects” in positions such as food servers and flight attendants.  Of 
course, we are ambivalent about beauty.  While we recognize its attraction, 
we also endorse norms that diminish its importance; “beauty is only skin 
deep,” “you can’t tell a book by its cover.”  Yet the fact is that we are 
inclined to reject the words of Kahlil Gibran: “Beauty is not in the face.  
Beauty is a light in the heart.”80  I think that the preference for beauty is 
an important counterexample to the case for hyperrationality in the market.  
I have no doubt but that responding to this preference produces non-
deserving losers and that it has decided negative externalities.  At the 
same time, I suspect that the preference can be frustrated only at 
considerable cost and that we are well advised just to let it go. 
C.  Perfectionism 
Kim Yuracko may disagree.  In her book, Perfectionism and 
Contemporary Feminist Values, and in a series of articles, Yuracko has 
defended a perfectionist theory of, and at least some features of, 
antidiscrimination law.81  Here I focus on her article, Private Nurses and 
Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination,82 in which 
Yuracko seeks to explain and defend the willingness of courts to allow 
 79. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment 
Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035-36 
(1987). 
 80. KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE EYE OF THE PROPHET 94 (Margaret Crosland trans., 
1995). 
 81. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST 
VALUES (2003). 
 82. Yuracko, supra note 48. 




employers to exclude men from certain jobs but not others.83  She argues 
that the best explanation is to be found in a perfectionist theory, which 
argues that some choices and ways of life are substantively good 
whereas others are bad.84
Now it is not always clear whether Yuracko is seeking to provide a 
causal or descriptive explanation of court decisions as contrasted with a 
normative justification of those decisions.  When she asks “why do 
courts distinguish between strip clubs and restaurants in cases where 
both are seeking to satisfy customer desire for sexual titillation?”85 it 
appears that she is asking a causal question, but there is little evidence 
that individual judges were relying on anything remotely like her 
perfectionist theory.  If we recast the question in normative terms, we 
can understand Yuracko as offering her versions of perfectionism as the 
best justification for these decisions, whatever their motivation.  Even 
this is not quite right.  I believe that Yuracko is best understood as offering a 
justification for antidiscrimination law and not as a justification of a 
particular application of the law.  In any case, I want to ask whether her 
version of perfectionism justifies the sorts of policies that the court has 
upheld. 
So interpreted, Yuracko seeks to justify antidiscrimination law in 
terms of a customer-focused perfectionism and a worker-focused 
perfectionism.  On closer inspection, Yuracko actually offers two versions 
of a customer-focused perfectionism: what might be called a self-worth 
perfectionism and an offense-based perfectionism.  A self-worth perfectionist 
maintains that “government should encourage the values, activities, and 
ends that are consistent with these better ways of life and discourage 
those that are not,” and that it can promote this aim by respecting some 
customer preferences and disrespecting others.86  From this perspective, 
accommodating an elderly woman’s preference to shield her body from 
exposure to males is a legitimate preference that overrides the interest 
that males might have in working as a nurse.  For one’s sense of privacy 
is “integral to an individual’s conception of self and self-worth.”87  By 
contrast, a male’s desire for sexual titillation is not “integral to an 
individual’s conception of self worth” or, if it is, it should not be.  
Because it is better for the character of the customer that he not be 
titillated in this way, this preference cannot trump or override the interests 
 83. See id.  For example, courts have allowed employers to exclude men from the 
position of Playboy Bunnies and private nurses, but not others, such as flight attendants, 
restaurant servers, and male prisons.  Id. at 149. 
 84. See id. at 153. 
 85. Id. at 150. 
 86. Id. at 153. 
 87. Id. 
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that prospective male employees might have for providing the relevant 
service.  Yuracko’s offense-based perfectionism maintains that whereas 
we may allow workers to engage in sexual titillation where the customer 
knowingly places himself in a position to be so titillated (as with 
Playboy Bunnies or strippers), we may want to protect the sensibilities 
of customers when they encounter women in mainstream businesses.88
We might ask two questions about these arguments.  First, are they 
really perfectionist?  Second, do the arguments work?  I believe that the 
self-worth argument is plausible, but I am not sure that it is genuinely 
perfectionist.  On one view, a perfectionist policy seeks to advance what 
is good for the targets of the policy as contrasted with the goodness of 
the target.  It is by no means clear that not allowing people to satisfy 
their illegitimate preferences is good for them unless we assume that 
such a policy will shape their character in morally desirable ways and 
that having a better character is better for that person.  With respect to 
the second argument, even if we assume, I believe somewhat implausibly, 
that people prefer to be shielded from “the jarring experience of having 
sexuality foisted upon them,”89 this is an argument from something like 
Feinberg’s Offense Principle rather than a form of perfectionism, unless 
we supplement it with a distinction between the jarring experiences from 
which we ought to protect people and those that do not deserve our 
intervention.90  Moreover, if most people did prefer not to encounter 
unexpected displays of other people’s sexuality, then we can expect the 
market to respond without the need for government intervention.  
Suppose, however, that more people enjoy being confronted with 
sexuality in traditional business contacts than do not.  Under these 
conditions, it might be argued that the preferences of the “jarred” should 
take priority over the preferences of the “non-jarred” because they are of 
greater moral worth.  But then the argument once again fails to represent 
a traditional form of perfectionism, unless it is assumed that not 
responding to a person’s illegitimate preference to be jarred is better for 
that person than responding to it. 
 88. See id. at 201 (“When people go to strip clubs, they expect to see explicit 
displays of sexuality, but when people walk onto airplanes or into hotel lobbies, they do 
not.  Prohibiting sexuality from creeping into these traditional businesses protects such 
customers from the jarring experience of having sexuality foisted upon them.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id.; see also JOEL FEINBERG, 2 MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
OFFENSE TO OTHERS 1 (1985). 




All that said, Yuracko’s principal line of argument appeals to worker-
based perfectionism.  Here, she is not so much interested in the 
distinction between the privacy cases (nurses) and the sexual titillation 
cases (Playboy Bunnies), but in the distinction between the pure sexual 
titillation cases (Playboy Bunnies and strippers) and what she calls plus-
sex cases, such as Hooters waitresses whose job is to serve food and 
simultaneously act as a sexual gaze object for the customers.91  Yuracko 
argues that when employers explicitly sexualize a job that is in essence a 
non-sex job, this creates a role confusion for the employee (“Am I a gaze 
object or a food server?”; “Am I a skilled flight attendant who can help 
passengers escape in case of an accident or a target for male sexual 
fantasy?”) and frustrates their intellectual development.92  Yuracko advances 
an empirical argument and a moral argument.  As a matter of empirical 
psychology, she argues that plus-sex jobs are bad for the employees.  As 
a matter of morality, she argues that we should seek to promote the 
employee’s intellectual development by prohibiting employees from defining 
their jobs in ways that hinder that development.93  Yuracko’s empirical claim 
may be correct, although the evidence she cites is decidedly underwhelming.  
She cites a study of forty male and forty-two female undergraduates in 
which the subjects were duped into putting on a sweater or a swim suit 
and then asked to take a math test that was supposedly unrelated to the 
study.94  The females in the swim suits underperformed the females in 
the sweaters.  Why?  Because being placed in a revealing outfit caused 
women to focus their mental energy on their body rather than on other 
tasks, and this self-objectification can occur just from wearing certain 
kinds of clothes even if they are not being viewed in those clothes.95  
This is not a lot of evidence, although the principal psychological claim 
may well be right.  I suspect, however, that even when women are not 
required to wear certain kinds of clothes, they are more concerned with 
their appearance than men, perhaps because men are more concerned 
with female appearance than women are concerned with male appearance.  
Despite all the fretting about the fragile female psyche to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the fact remains that females do better in school than 
males—by a wide margin.  Their self-objectification does not seem to 
hinder their intellectual development.  In general, I suspect that women are 
more capable of handling the role confusion than Yuracko seems to 
 91. Yuracko, supra note 48, at 173. 
 92. Id. at 203-04. 
 93. See id. at 207. 
 94. Id. at 208 (citing Barbara Fredrickson et al., That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex 
Differences in Self-Objectification, Restrained Eating, and Math Performance, 75 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 269 (1998). 
 95. See id. at 209. 
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think.  My best guess is that many college students leave their jobs at 
Hooters and go back to studying with full mental energy and with more 
tips in their pockets than they would otherwise earn, having separated 
many superficial males from their hard-earned dollars. 
Let us grant Yuracko’s empirical claim.  Should courts seek to promote 
female intellectual development by prohibiting employers from defining 
jobs in this way?  First, I suspect that Yuracko vastly overestimates the 
impact of antidiscrimination law in this area.  I find it hard to believe her 
claim that law firms and universities do not make sex appeal an explicit 
requirement for positions because they are prohibited from doing so.96  
More importantly, Yuracko does not confront the more obvious moral 
objections to her worker-based perfectionism, which are no less important 
for being relatively obvious.  First, even if sex-plus jobs do impede a 
woman’s intellectual development, it is by no means clear that all 
reasonable persons must place such weight on the intellect.  Yuracko 
says that “courts may be in a better position than even women themselves to 
weigh the social costs of women’s lost intellectual development,” but it 
is not quite clear what she is claiming.97  If she is arguing that sex-plus 
jobs have social costs or negative externalities, then courts may be better 
positioned to weigh those costs than the individual employees themselves.  
But that argument has nothing to do with perfectionism or the interests 
of the employees.  If she is claiming that courts are better positioned than 
the employees to evaluate what is good for the employees themselves, 
then the argument is quite problematic.  I have no general objection to 
paternalism when we have reason to think people are making a factual 
error as to what advances their interests (and perhaps women do 
empirically underestimate the effect of sex-plus work on their psyche), 
but I think we must be much more cautious when we engage in moral 
paternalism, when we believe that a person is not giving appropriate 
weight to a value, be it safety, excitement, intellectual development, or 
money.  It is one thing to compel someone to receive a blood transfusion 
when they wrongly believe it is likely to be infected with HIV.  It is 
another thing to compel someone to receive a blood transfusion when 
their religious principles prohibit it.98
 96. See id. at 211 (“The fact that such jobs do not exist is probably more a function 
of the state of current antidiscrimination law than of their social inconceivability.”). 
 97. Id. at 206 n.218. 
 98. For example, the religious principles of Jehovah’s Witnesses prohibit them 
from accepting blood transfusions. 




I am skeptical of perfectionism cum moral paternalism not because I 
think that people cannot make mistakes about values and not because I 
want to place “autonomy” as an inviolable moral principle.  I think Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are making a colossal mistake in refusing blood transfusions.  
At the same time, I think that the range of reasonable judgments as to 
what is best for a person is relatively large.  Does Yuracko want to 
compel the Jehovah’s Witness to receive a transfusion?  If not, I think 
she should be reluctant to interfere with a woman’s choice to suffer the 
cramped intellectual development of a plus-sex job and to receive the 
income she might thereby earn. 
More importantly, we must remember that perfectionism is not just a 
theory of objective value, although it presupposes such a view.  
Perfectionism is a political theory that claims that it is permissible for 
the state to use coercion to advance the excellence of its citizens.  John 
Stuart Mill is a perfectionist about value.  He believes that some ways of 
life are better than others.  But, for at least two reasons, Mill is a non-
perfectionist with respect to political theory.  First, as a matter of 
developmental psychology, Mill thinks that people will develop their 
capacities best if they are left alone to make choices for themselves, 
including bad choices, rather than being led to the good choices by the 
state.  Second, Mill is quite skeptical that society will generally make 
better choices for its citizens than the citizens themselves.99  After producing 
numerous arguments for his version of the harm principle, Mill famously 
offers a probabilistic argument: “But the strongest of all the arguments 
against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is 
that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in 
the wrong place.”100  I do not claim here that we should regard the conditions 
of employment as “purely personal conduct,” but Mill’s skepticism may 
still apply.  Yuracko’s perfectionism presupposes a high degree of confidence 
that the state’s power will be exercised in ways that advance the interests 
of women, and that is much more confidence than I can muster.  None of 
this denies the force of other arguments for the laws that Yuracko seeks 
to defend, but before unleashing the various branches of our government 
to do battle on behalf of any perfectionist vision, we had better be very 
confident that they will exercise that power wisely.  In antidiscrimination 
law as elsewhere, a healthy liberal skepticism may be in order.  Liberalism 
as second-best may be the best we can do. 
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